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CALLICLES’ RETURN: GORGIAS 509-522 RECONSIDERED
Malcolm Schofield
St John’s College, Cambridge
Résumé. Le débat sur la confrontation entre Socrate et Calliclès dans le Gorgias 
s’est principalement concentré sur ses deux premières étapes : l’exposé par Calli-
clès de ses thèses et leur tentative de réfutation par Socrate (481-500), ainsi que 
ses tentatives subséquentes de leur substituer sa propre conception de la vie bonne 
(501-509). On a accordé beaucoup moins d’attention à la dernière étape (509-
522). C’est pourtant celle dans laquelle Platon met en scène la discussion la plus 
soutenue du dialogue entre les réponses concurrentes (et leurs conséquences) à ce 
qu’on a montré être sa question centrale : le plus grand mal est-il de commettre l’in-
justice ou d’en être victime ? Cet article examine en détail les étapes clefs de ce débat, 
auquel Calliclès est à nouveau invité à participer par Socrate, après qu’il a refusé 
de continuer à mi-chemin de la seconde phase du parcours dialectique. La thèse 
défendue est que le but de Platon dans cette dernière section est de montrer exac-
tement pourquoi et comment Socrate peut entamer et poursuivre avec succès une 
confrontation intellectuelle avec un jeune politicien intelligent, désireux de réussir 
sa carrière dans la démocratie athénienne, tel qu’a été décrit Calliclès. Il échoue à 
le convaincre. Mais contrairement à ce qui est parfois supposé, cela n’a rien d’un 
échec en termes de communication intellectuelle  ; la question est de savoir plutôt 
quels engagements fondamentaux diférents Platon cherche à nous faire distinguer.
Summary. Discussion of the conrontation between Socrates and Callicles in the 
Gorgias has mostly focused on its irst two phases: Callicles’ statement of his views and 
Socrates’ attempted refutations (481-500) and Socrates’ subsequent attempt to substi-
tute his own conception of the good life (501-9). Much less attention has been paid to 
the inal phase (509-22). But this is where Plato stages the most sustained debate in the 
dialogue between alternative answers – with their consequences – to what has by now 
proved to be its central question: is committing injustice or falling victim to it the greatest 
evil? his article examines in detail the key moves in the debate, in which Callicles is 
again tempted by Socrates to participate, ater refusing to continue midway through the 
second phase of the dialectic. It is argued that Plato’s aim in this inal section of the 
conversation is to show just why and how Socrates might successfully initiate and sustain 
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intellectual engagement with an intelligent young politician hoping to rise within the 
Athenian democracy, such as Callicles is portrayed as being. He fails to persuade him. 
But this is not, as is sometimes supposed, a failure of intellectual communication. It is a 
matter of what Plato wants us to understand as diferent fundamental commitments.
1. Introduction
he Gorgias has unsurprisingly been attracting considerable philosophical 
attention in recent times. No one who has got into Plato ever forgets the 
perennially intriguing igure of Callicles presented there, perhaps the most 
eloquent and passionate of all Socrates’ discussion partners in the dialogues, 
invested – some readers have felt – with an unusual personal emotion. And 
the confrontation Plato stages in the dialogue between Callicles and Socrates 
and its many theoretical dimensions has stimulated much ine philosophical 
scholarship of late.
Discussion however has largely been conined to Callicles’ initial presen-
tation of his position (482-6), to Socrates’ ensuing critique (487-500), and 
to his subsequent attempt to substitute his own view of the good life as 
governed by order and restraint (sophrosune) (501-9). hese are the stretches 
of argumentation which (for example) Charles Kahn and John Cooper in 
two signiicant studies make their focus.1 And one might sometimes get the 
impression that, although the dialogue has almost another twenty pages to 
run, it will present no further philosophical conversation of much import 
between Callicles and Socrates. 
Indeed one of the latest contributions to study of the Gorgias says just 
that:2
at 505d Callicles announces that he will no longer cooperate with Socrates. 
He tells him to either stop or carry on the discussion with someone else. 
Since no one present is willing to take over from Callicles, Socrates performs 
the remarkable feat of going it alone for almost another twenty pages. For 
the largest part of the remainder of the dialogue he asks and answers his own 
questions – a peculiar picture, unparalleled in Plato’s writings. 
here have naturally been plenty of exceptions to the general neglect of 
the argumentation of 509-513 in particular. Both Rachana Kamtekar and 
1. Kahn 1983, Cooper 1999.
2. Dimas 2015 p. 84.
10 Malcolm Schoield
James Doyle, in articles to which I shall recur, have written interestingly on 
that material.3 But these are not pages of the dialogue on which scholars 
generally dwell most – despite the importance of the material: which is what 
in this article I shall be trying to bring out. I ofer a fairly detailed commen-
tary on the progress of the discussion in these pages between Socrates and 
Callicles, with briefer comments on its further development from 513-522. 
Readers will ind a résumé of its general upshot in my short concluding 
section.
he truth is that – contrary to what Panos Dimas suggests in the passage 
just quoted – Callicles resumes his role as Socrates’ answerer at 509c.4 Nor 
does he subsequently again relinquish it in the passage launched by the 
combination of Socrates’ question there and his reply, which is an extended 
one (509-522). he words that prompt him to reenter the conversation are 
those Socrates speaks in a return to what has become its central topic of debate, 
and will remain so to the very end of the dialogue: the question of what is 
the greatest evil that can befall someone – committing injustice, or being its 
victim? hat inished up as the main and inal focus of Socrates’ preceding 
conversation with Polus (from 469b onwards). Socrates’ increasingly 
provocative stance on the issue was what precipitated Callicles’ initial 
intervention at 481b. And in summing up the morals he thinks should be 
learned from the dialogue’s discussions as a whole, Socrates begins (527b):5
Among so many arguments, while the others are proved wrong, this 
argument alone stands its ground – that we should more beware of acting 
unjustly than of being treated unjustly, and that more than anything, what a 
man should practice, both in private life and public life, is not seeming to be 
good, but being good.
So with Callicles’ reengagement in argument at 509c, Plato not only 
announces a new phase in the treatment of the issues being discussed. It is 
also his way of engineering a move away from preoccupation with Callicles’ 
own distinctive position on the good life, and with Socrates’ attempts irst to 
refute it and then to build an alternative conception of his own, back to what 
will end up being represented as the core argument of the entire dialogue 
in that passage on the last page of the retailing of the myth. In short, this is 
marked as a moment of extraordinary signiicance in what is by any measure 
one of Plato’s most important works – and as it happens, longest, too (only 
Republic and Laws are longer). It is strange that it has not attracted greater 
attention.
3. Kamtekar 2005, Doyle 2006; see also e.g. Ober 1998 p. 207-209.
4. Socrates’ virtuoso solo double act in fact lasts from just 506c to 507c: one Stephanus 
page only.
5. Sedley 2009 p. 53-54 points out that the morals Socrates draws here all in fact relate in 
the irst instance to the arguments of the Polus section.
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2. Reengaging Callicles
What most immediately pulls Callicles back into argumentative 
engagement is a question about security: which is the most important form 
of security a person needs to be able to provide for himself (and his friends 
and family)? Socrates sums up a key observation he has just made on the issue 
in the preceding context as follows (509c):
he credit of being able to help against each evil, and the disgrace of being 
unable, depends in each case on its magnitude.
And he then addresses Callicles:
Is that wide of the mark, Callicles, or is that how it is?
Callicles breaks his prolonged silence and responds:
No, it’s not wide of the mark.
To understand why it should be at just this point that Callicles is 
drawn back into the discussion once more, we need to do a little retracing 
of Socrates’ steps. Almost a page before Socrates has concluded the line of 
reasoning launched by his solo double act with the words (508c):
hese things being so, let us ask ourselves what exactly your complaint is 
against me. Is it fair comment or not, when you say the result [i.e. of Socrates’ 
position that committing injustice is a greater evil than being treated unjustly] 
is that I am incapable of helping either myself or any of my friends, or family 
either, or of rescuing them from the greatest dangers?
In other words, Socrates is signalling that he is now returning to the basic 
disagreement between him and Callicles. He goes on to insist famously that 
while he is not claiming to know the truth of the conclusion he asserts, the 
reasoning he had developed in the Polus conversation for the thesis that 
treating someone else unjustly is both worse and more disgraceful for the 
perpetrator than for the person being treated unjustly is “held in place and 
secured by arguments made of iron and adamant” (508e-509a). hen he 
draws an inference, concluding with the summing up observation quoted 
above (509b-c):
I take the view that this is how things are. If injustice is the greatest of evils for 
the person acting unjustly, and greater still than this greatest, if such a thing 
were possible, is for the person acting unjustly not to pay the just penalty, 
what then is the ‘help’ of which it really is true to say that if a person can’t 
provide it for himself he will become a laughing-stock? Isn’t it that help 
which will avert the greatest harm from us? It necessarily follows that this 
is the help it is most disgraceful not to be able to give, whether to oneself or 
to one’s friends or family. Second would be help against the second greatest 
evil, third help against the third, and so on. he credit of being able to help 
against each evil, and the disgrace of being unable, depends in each case on 
its magnitude.
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I have two proposals to ofer regarding the argumentative sequence 
I have set out here. First, what renews Callicles’ interest in rejoining the 
conversation is precisely Socrates’ return to what he correctly describes as 
Callicles’ chief complaint against him: of being powerless in the face of injus-
tice. Second, what elicits his agreement with Socrates is naturally not the 
thesis that committing injustice is worse than being its victim, but simply 
the observation Socrates makes in summing up the train of thought he is 
now presenting: “he credit of being able to help against each evil, and the 
disgrace of being unable, depends in each case on its magnitude.”
What should lend persuasiveness to my irst claim is the way Callicles 
formulated his ideas when he burst in upon Socrates’ discussion with Polus 
in the irst place. He formulated his theory of natural justice at the outset in 
terms of what is naturally most shameful or disgraceful (483a), turning the 
terminology Socrates had resorted to in the Polus argument on its head, and 
rejecting as contemptible the slavish person “for whom death is preferable 
to life – who when he is treated unjustly and downtrodden is incapable of 
helping himself or anyone he cares for” (483b). It was Callicles, too, who in 
that same context introduced the talk Socrates recycles here of what makes 
someone a “laughing-stock” (484d-485c), which morphed into the charge 
that Socrates’ philosophizing would land him with the disgrace of being quite 
unable to help and save himself or anyone else from “the greatest dangers” –
such as being hauled before the court and ending up by being put to death 
(486a-b). So when Socrates at 508c explicitly recurs to these complaints, no 
wonder if his appetite for argument is freshly piqued.
Now for my second claim: when it is irst introduced, the proposal that 
not being able to provide the help needed to avert the greatest harm from 
us represents the height of what is disgraceful or shameful is presented as 
contingent upon a condition. he suggestion is that we should adopt it 
if we accept the Socratic view that “injustice is the greatest of evils for the 
person acting unjustly, and greater still than this greatest, if such a thing were 
possible, is for the person acting unjustly not to pay the just penalty.” But ‘if ’ 
does not equate to ‘if and only if ’; and as the passage goes on, Socrates enun-
ciates the proposal in terms progressively less speciic, almost as an abstract 
calculus, until in his inal formulation it takes the entirely general assertoric 
form of the proposition that the greater the magnitude of the evil against 
which help is needed, the greater the disgrace of not being able to supply it. 
And most immediately, of course, that is the formulation of which Socrates 
asks: “Is that wide of the mark?” With such a formulation he ofers Callicles 
something to which his interlocutor can assent, without necessarily implying 
acceptance of Socrates’ identiication of what the evil of greatest magnitude 
should be taken to be. Indeed it could only be the general abstract formu-
lation of the proposition that would have any chance – at this stage of the 
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dialectic of the dialogue – of constituting any common ground between him 
and Socrates, and of drawing him into anything other than violent disagree-
ment once more.
3. Power and assimilation
What now follows is an exploration by Socrates – in which Callicles is 
kept actively engaged – of the kind of resources (the “help”) people need if 
they are to protect themselves from harm. It will crucially involve introdu-
cing considerations of power, and the development of what I shall be calling 
the assimilation thesis. In this section of the paper I present a commentary 
on the way Socrates irst gets Callicles’ assent to proposals put to him about 
power and assimilation, and then seeks to get his agreement to what will be 
represented as a consequence he will ind disconcerting.
Here, then, is how Socrates begins to pursue the question of what help or 
resources are relevant for the relevant self-protection (509c-d):
Socrates: Of the two, then – acting unjustly and being treated unjustly – we 
are saying that acting unjustly is a greater evil, and being treated unjustly is a 
lesser. What form of self-help, then, could a person equip himself with so as 
to have both these forms of protection – against acting unjustly and against 
being treated unjustly? Is it power or will he needs? Let me put it like this: 
will he avoid being treated unjustly if he wants not to be treated unjustly, or if 
he equips himself with some power of not being treated unjustly?
Callicles: Clearly the second – if he equips himself with some power.
“We are saying that acting unjustly is a greater evil, and being treated 
unjustly is a lesser.” In Socrates’ previous speech it was “I take the view that 
this is how things are.” And that was in a context in which his personal stance 
in philosophy was what was being stressed (ego and its related adjective occur 
emphatically no less than twelve times in the preceding sixteen lines of text: 
508d-509a). Presumably the ‘we’ (but this is an unemphatic ‘we’) indicates 
that Socrates is proceeding here as though Callicles’ agreement to what he 
had said there was not merely to the general proposition about the need 
for help against harm, but to identiication of committing injustice as what 
constitutes the greatest harm. 
However what he then goes on to put to Callicles is a question about the 
kind of self-help needed to stave of both acting unjustly and being treated 
unjustly: is it power or will? And interestingly – at this point we begin to 
sense the development of a Socratic tactic for keeping Callicles not merely 
talking, but genuinely engaged – the version of the question for which he 
speciically invites a response from him relates to being treated unjustly. hat 
is to say, he takes irst the case that in Callicles’ scheme of things does indeed 
represent a very great danger, although a lesser one than committing injustice 
as Socrates himself sees it. So, of course, Callicles has no di culty in conti-
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nuing to cooperate, and to answer that the resource one needs is power.
Socrates can accordingly continue the questioning (509d-e):
And what about acting unjustly? Is it just a question of not wanting to act 
unjustly? Will that be enough – he won’t act unjustly – or is there a need in 
this case too to equip himself with some power and art or science, because if 
he doesn’t learn them and put them into practice, he will act unjustly? hat’s 
the question I need you to answer, Callicles. Do you think the agreement 
Polus and I were driven to earlier in the discussion was correct, when we 
agreed that no-one acts unjustly on purpose, but that all those who act 
unjustly do so unwillingly?
Callicles’ response to this question demonstrates that he is ater all very 
far from having come round to Socrates’ thinking about the evil of commit-
ting injustice. He indicates that he is prepared to say “Yes”, but only to assist 
completion of the argument, not because that is what he really thinks (510a):
It may as well be, Socrates, if you like. Just so you can inish the argument.
Socrates is prepared to accept the answer as agreement enough. He conti-
nues (510a):
It looks, then, as if here too we do need to equip ourselves with some power 
and some art – to stop us acting unjustly.
Callicles assents – ‘‘We certainly do” – but presumably once more to 
enable completion of the argument, rather than out of conviction.
With the next shit in the questioning, however, Socrates moves the 
discussion right back towards prime Calliclean territory – and Callicles is 
delighted (510a-b):
Socrates: In which case, what is the art or science that equips people with the 
power of not being treated unjustly at all – or as little as possible? See if you 
think as I do. his is what I think it is: I think a person needs to be either 
ruler himself – or even tyrant – in his city, or else a close associate (hetairos) 
of the existing regime.
Callicles: Do you see, Socrates, how ready I am to give praise when you get 
something right? I think what you’ve just said puts it quite admirably.
By now we may not be surprised that in raising this question about the 
requisite power to provide needed resource against harm, Socrates irst takes 
the case – being untreated unjustly – for which Callicles may be expected to 
be truly keen to ind an answer. What however might come as a shock is the 
suggested answer that Socrates has volunteered, and not least the insertion in 
it of the elaboration “or even tyrant”. he idea that tyrants are those who have 
great power was earlier the line Polus took – quite mistakenly, as Socrates 
argued (e.g. 466a-e). And a little further on in this exchange with Callicles he 
indicates once again that he for his part distances himself from that notion: 
“as you and your lot would argue it” (510e).
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But Socrates’ stance is perhaps more complex than one might on that basis 
infer. he issue most immediately at stake in that part of the Polus conversa-
tion was whether a tyrant who puts someone to death demonstrates in doing 
so the power to do what he really wants – to achieve something good – rather 
than what he merely pleases. hat was what Socrates contested. Yet if a tyrant 
(or anybody else) had the power to protect himself or others from being 
subject to injustice, the same line of argument could not easily be used to 
deny that that was at least a power of some signiicance. Nor would Socrates 
have similar motivation to argue that it was not. He had agreed earlier in 
the conversation with Polus (469c) that he himself would not want to be 
treated unjustly (but would rather that than act unjustly). And at the latest 
stage of that discussion, where he was arguing paradoxically for not bringing 
enemies to justice, he had inserted the rider “provided we are not ourselves 
being unjustly treated by our enemy” (480e). In truth there is nothing that 
is intrinsically ‘tyrannical’ in the power to protect against injustice, even if 
it was thought characteristic of tyrants to surround themselves with body-
guards (R. 8, 566b). 
Nonetheless in reintroducing the tyrant into the conversation, Socrates 
is undoubtedly shiting discussion into territory that Callicles might be 
expected to ind more appealing than much other Socratic talk. No won- 
der that Callicles makes in response his most enthusiastic answer in the 
entire dialogue. Why the resort to this argumentative expedient? Precisely 
because Socrates needs to ind a premise Callicles is truly happy to embrace, 
consistently with the fundamental beliefs about power he articulated in his 
long speech (especially at 483a-484c), which can then be exploited to drive 
him at last into something like genuine confession of the inadequacy of his 
entire stance. 
Socrates starts the process of trying to achieve just that by developing 
next at some length what we may think of as the highly signiicant assimila-
tion thesis, irst in general terms (510b-d):
Socrates: Very well. hen see if you think I’m right about something else as 
well. I think one person is most a friend to another when it’s a case, as wise 
men of old say, of ‘like to like’. Don’t you think so too?
Callicles: I do.
Socrates: So where a tyrant is a savage and uncivilised ruler, if there were 
someone in the city much better than him, would the tyrant presumably fear 
him, and be incapable of ever becoming friends wholeheartedly with him?
Callicles: hat is so.
Socrates: And even if there were someone much inferior, this person couldn’t 
be his friend either. he tyrant would despise him. He’d never be able to take 
him seriously as a friend.
Callicles: hat’s true as well.
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Socrates: he only friend let worth speaking of, then, for a person like this, 
is someone of the same character as himself, someone who condemns and 
approves the same things – but is prepared to be ruled and submit to the 
ruler. his person will have great power in this city, this person no-one will 
treat unjustly without regretting it. Isn’t that how it is?
Callicles: Yes.
hen Socrates applies the thesis to the likes of Callicles himself (510d-e):
Socrates: In which case, suppose one of the young men in this city were to 
wonder: “In what way could I have great power and make sure nobody treats 
me unjustly?” here is a way for him, it seems, which is to accustom himself, 
from an early age, to have the same likes and dislikes as the despot, and take 
appropriate steps to become as like him as possible. Isn’t that how it is?
Callicles: Yes.
Socrates: So for this person, the goal of not being treated unjustly and having 
great power in the city – as you and your lot would argue it – will surely have 
been accomplished.
Callicles: Indeed it will.
he intention to exhibit the ad hominem attractions of this scenario for 
his interlocutor could not be underlined more clearly.
he assimilation thesis is eventually going to prove crucial for the attempt 
to undermine Callicles’ conviction that friendship with the tyrant or other 
ruler will aford a person with the power to protect himself against unjust 
treatment. And that (not the commission of injustice, which is what of 
course concerns Socrates himself more) has remained the focus throughout 
the present stretch of argument. It is therefore important that Callicles is 
represented as entertaining no qualms whatever about the thesis. One 
might wonder whether he might have objected that only the appearance of 
assimilation is needed for such friendship. hat is a possibility Socrates will 
envisage being raised as an objection later on in this section of the dialogue 
(513b), and will be discussed at the appropriate point below. One might 
also wonder whether it is being too easily taken for granted that the security 
friendship is assumed to bring can be treated as unqualiied? What if the 
ruler or tyrant ultimately turns on his friend (before the friend turns on 
the tyrant)? Socrates will indeed exploit something akin to that possibility 
in due course (515e-516e). However perhaps Plato calculates that it will 
seldom be a possibility suicient to deter those hungry for power from 
cultivating friendship with the ruler, even if – as would be likely enough – 
such eventualities occur to them. he security of the friendship is simply the 
hypothesis they will act upon, to protect themselves from injustice as best 
they can at the hands of others.
So it is understandable if Callicles is represented as content with the 
reasoning he is presented with. But by now we might almost have forgotten 
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that the question of the help needed to secure ourselves against great evils 
was originally raised by Socrates in the context of reiteration of his own 
claim that the greatest of all evils is committing injustice. Now he returns to 
that topic of acting unjustly (510e-511c):
Socrates: And not acting unjustly as well? Far from it, if he’s going to be like 
the ruler, assuming an unjust one, and exercise great power alongside him. 
No, I think it’ll be just the opposite. He will so equip himself as to be able to 
do as much injustice as possible, and not pay the penalty for it when he does 
act unjustly. Yes?
Callicles: It looks that way.
Socrates: So the greatest evil will be his, maimed in soul and in a bad way as 
he is, through his imitation of the despot and the power it gives him.
Callicles: I don’t know how you keep twisting the argument, Socrates – tur-
ning it upside down. Don’t you realise that this person who does imitate the 
tyrant will, if he feels like it, put the person who doesn’t imitate him to death, 
and coniscate his possessions?
Socrates: Yes, I do realise that, my worthy Callicles. I’m not deaf. I’ve heard 
it enough times today from you and Polus – and from pretty well everybody 
else in the city. Now it’s time for you to listen to me. Yes, he will put him to 
death, if he feels like it, but it will be someone bad putting a ine, upstanding 
individual to death.
Callicles: Isn’t that what’s so upsetting about it?
Socrates: Not if you look at it sensibly, as the argument shows. Do you think 
a person needs to equip himself for this: to stay alive as long as possible, prac-
tising those skills which always preserve us from danger – like the rhetoric 
which you instruct me to practise because it keeps us safe in the law courts?
Callicles: Yes, very sound advice too, for goodness’ sake.
his is another rich and richly indicative passage. First of all, we should 
notice that Socrates now makes clear – if that was not already clear – the 
distance between his own position and the idea of friendship with a tyrant 
as supplying the power we need to stave of the greatest evils. As James Doyle 
points out, his initial suggestion in this argumentative sequence efectively 
implies that ‘if you are bent on avoiding sufering injustice, you must ally 
yourself with evil’ – or at least it does if your conception of power is a tyran-
nical one.6 Callicles’ response – “It looks that way (φαίνεται)” – sounds 
as though we are meant to think this turn in the conversation takes him 
somewhat by surprise. he impression is reinforced by his next reply: the 
accusation that Socrates is “twisting the argument”. 
What prompts that further reply is Socrates’ use next of the most forceful 
vocabulary at his disposal. he assertion that if someone equips himself 
6. Doyle 2006 p. 98.
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with the ability to commit as much injustice as possible, and to get away 
with it, then ‘the greatest evil will be his, maimed in soul and in a bad way 
as he is’, is strong meat. In expressing himself in such terms, Socrates reverts 
not only to the position he had eventually argued in the conversation with 
Polus (to Callicles’ violent indignation), but to language reminiscent of the 
Polus episode too: e.g. his talk there of a soul that is “rotten” (479b), or again 
“festering and incurable” (480b). 
When Callicles then accuses Socrates of “twisting the argument” and 
“turning it upside down”, his further comment indicates – in the vein Polus 
had worked before him (470c-471e) – that he has no problem with the 
thought that the tyrant’s imitator and friend will be prepared to commit 
murderous injustice against someone who is not such an imitator and friend, 
and (presumably) that he will prosper that way. He for his part makes clear 
his continuing disbelief that any sane person could rate committing injustice 
a worse evil than being put to death and having one’s property sequestered.
Perhaps the most interesting element in the exchange is Socrates’ subse-
quent observation: “Yes, he will put him to death, if he feels like it, but it 
will be someone bad putting a ine, upstanding individual to death”, and the 
way Callicles replies: “Isn’t that what’s so upsetting about it?” His talk of 
someone “bad” (poneros) putting to death a “ine, upstanding individual” 
(kalos kagathos) interestingly combines his own characteristic vocabulary 
with language Callicles is himself happy to use. “Bad” (poneros) once more 
calls the Polus conversation to mind. Socrates had there (477b-e; cf. 470e) 
identiied injustice as what above all makes for “badness of soul” (psuches 
poneria). It is presumably on that identiication that he relies in calling “bad” 
the person who equips himself with the ability to commit as much injustice 
as possible. Kalos kagathos, on the other hand, is an expression Callicles uses 
(not in general Socrates himself in this dialogue): in talking of the aristo-
cratic ideal to which he aspires (484d), and indeed as something for which 
Socratic philosophy cannot equip a person. 
So at this point Socrates is switching into a form of words that Callicles 
might well ind resonating with his own scheme of values. Terry Irwin7 appo-
sitely draws attention to a passage, again in the Polus conversation (470e), 
where Socrates contrasts someone who is kalos kagathos, and as such happy, 
with the ‘‘unjust and bad (poneros)’’ person, whom he calls “wretched”. 
Socrates would presumably there intend kalos kagathos to imply a Socratic 
ideal of virtue,8 whether or not he means it to convey its usual aristocratic 
connotations.9 But Polus can take it simply in that latter sense. He has 
7. Irwin 1979 p. 230.
8. So Dodds 1959 p. 242-243, in an excellent note. 
9. Dodds says that “Socrates deliberately excludes the social meaning here” (and at 515a, 
also cited). But how would Polus be meant to know or accept that? I ind Socrates’ dialectical 
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just introduced a mention of Archelaus, ruler of Macedon. And when he 
responds to Socrates’ contrasts it quickly becomes clear that an aristocratic 
kalos kagathos is very far from what he takes Archelaus, the duplicitous and 
ruthless son of a slave, to be (471a-c).
What should we make of Callicles’ reaction: “Isn’t that what’s so upset-
ting about it?”? Dodds comments: “We need not (with Ast and Stallbaum) 
construe this as malicious mockery; Callicles feels genuine eunoia (487a3) 
towards Socrates and the Socratic man, however mistaken he thinks them.”10 
I think it more likely that what disturbs Callicles is the thought that an aris-
tocratic kalos kagathos might be the victim of the injustice of the tyrant or his 
friend.11 In his responses to Socrates’ probing he had earlier taken the view 
that the “better” are the “more powerful” (488b-489d, with further subse-
quent clariications). But when Socrates introduces the idea of two sorts of 
rhetoric – one designed simply to latter people and indulge their desires, 
the other to make them better citizens – Callicles has no di culty in accep-
ting it, and suggests hemistocles, Pericles, and others as practitioners of the 
second type (502d-503d). Clearly this is a diferent way of thinking about 
‘‘better’’ than one which predicates it only of the powerful. 
Moreover, earlier in this very sequence of argument he has had no qualms 
about agreeing to consider the case Socrates puts to him of someone ‘‘much 
better’’ than a “savage and uncivilised ruler”, and therefore no realistic candi-
date for his friendship (510b-c). he earlier equivalence between “better” 
and “more powerful” begins to show its colours, as something extorted from 
Callicles under dialectical pressure, but not fully representing the rather 
contradictory set of values he actually seems to hold. here is much of the 
traditional civic-minded aristocrat about him. So he can perhaps see as real 
possibility the prospect that such an admirable person might be victimized 
by a despot, or by the friend of a despot. And he owns that this is indeed 
an upsetting thought. I would suppose that he does make the remark in a 
sarcastic spirit (contra Dodds): 
Of course, Socrates. he point all along has been that we “ine, upstanding 
individuals” do need to be in a position to wield power ourselves if we are to 
defend ourselves against being unjustly treated.
So Socrates’ comment in response to the charge that he is “twisting” the 
argument does not begin to shit Callicles from his position. he turn it 
took was meant to start focusing on the “bad” person who commits injus-
tice. What concerns Callicles, however, remains the harm sustained by the 
person unjustly treated. And right to the end of the dialogue he will continue 
tactics in these contexts rather more ambiguous than does Dodds.
10. Dodds 1959 p. 346. His construal of Callicles’ comment here perhaps better its the 
similar but not quite identical exchange at 521b-c.
11. So Irwin 1979 p. 230-231.
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to prove impervious to Socrates’ suggestion that he should take the “sensible” 
view: by which, I take it, is meant the view that being treated unjustly is 
not nearly such a bad thing as committing injustice, as indicated by what 
“the argument shows” (the argument developed at 474c-475e, in the Polus 
conversation, already referred to just previously at 508c-509a). But by adop-
ting what I have supposed to be Callicles-speak at this point (“ine, upstan-
ding individual” – further telling use of related Calliclean talk of the real 
“man” will shortly be made: 512d-e), Socrates succeeds once again in keeping 
him engaged in the conversation.
4. Security 
In one sense Socrates has so far achieved very little in the dialectic since 
Callicles decided to rejoin the conversation. On the central issue of what 
the greatest harm is that a person can sufer, they remain as far apart as ever 
they were. On the other hand, the introduction of the issue of how one 
should avoid getting into the shameful position of being unable to secure 
oneself against harm has certainly succeeded in tempting Callicles back into 
re-engagement with Socrates. He is particularly pleased with the return to a 
preoccupation with power. And there is one key proposition he is prepared 
to accept: the assimilation thesis. But once the conversation shited to the 
issue of committing injustice, any hope of further convergence of view disap-
peared. 
Callicles’ latest response – avowing some distress at the prospect of some 
“ine, upstanding individual” being unjustly put to death – gives Socrates an 
opening for taking discussion back to the issue of self-protection, which is 
where his questioning has so far been most productive. He says (511b-c):
Socrates: Not if you look at it sensibly, as the argument shows. Do you think 
a person needs to equip himself for this: to stay alive as long as possible, prac-
tising those skills which always preserve us from danger – like the rhetoric 
which you instruct me to practise because it keeps us safe in the law courts?
Callicles: Yes, very sound advice too, for goodness’ sake.
Socrates’ initial remark (“as the argument shows”) refers back to the Polus 
section of the dialogue, on whether acting unjustly or being treated unjustly 
is worse (474c-475e), and recalled by him just before Callicles reenters the 
discussion (508c-509a) as “arguments made of iron and adamant”. But he 
now changes tack: to consider the general question of techniques needed to 
ensure self-preservation. When Callicles is challenged outright as to whether 
what he attaches importance to is the acquisition and practice of life-preser-
ving skills, such as the rhetoric of the law courts that he encouraged Socrates 
to take seriously in his great speech (485e-486d), he gives a robust positive 
answer. hat triggers the following brief exchange (511c):
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Socrates: Is it really, sir? And what about knowing how to swim? Are you 
equally impressed by that as a branch of knowledge?
Callicles: Oh, for heaven’s sake! Of course not.
At this point Socrates adopts a further change of tack: not in subject 
matter, as in the extracts of text just quoted, but in mode of argument. He 
reacts to Callicles’ enthusiasm for rhetoric by launching into an extended 
torrent of rhetoric himself. He starts by comparing in familiar style the view 
we take of generally recognized life-saving skills, such as those commanded 
by helmsmen, the makers of siege engines, and doctors. hese are all very 
well in their way, although if the helmsman gets you safely to port that will 
not be of much signiicance, if the life you then go on to lead is not worth 
living. Experts such as these are aware of the limited scope of their skills, and 
for that reason give themselves no great airs. Here is what Socrates ends up 
saying about the makers of siege-engines (512c-d):
When you call him a maker of engines, it’s by way of disparagement. You 
wouldn’t be prepared to give your daughter to his son in marriage, nor would 
you take his daughter for your son. And yet, given your reasons for praising 
your own accomplishments, what justiication do you have for looking down 
on the maker of engines and the other people I mentioned just now? I know 
you would say you are a better man, and of better family. Yet if better is not 
what I say it is, if human excellence just comes down to this – preserving 
oneself and one’s possessions, whatever kind of person one may in fact be – 
then it becomes absurd, your inding fault with the maker of engines and the 
doctor and all the other arts and sciences which have been developed with a 
view to keeping us safe.
And he now invites Callicles to consider a diferent point of view, appea-
ling to that conception of the real “man” Callicles himself had etched in 
his portrait of the ideal of the “ine, upstanding” individual (512d-513a; 
cf. 483b, 484d):
Would you deign to consider whether the noble and the good may not 
be something other than keeping safe and being kept safe? Maybe this is 
something – living for a particular length of time – which the real man should 
forget about, and maybe he should not be too devoted to life, but trusting to 
god in these matters, and believing the old wives’ tale that nobody can escape 
his destiny, should on that basis decide how he can best live whatever time is 
given him to live – whether by assimilating himself so far as possible to the 
political system in force where he is living? 
It is the inal question appended to this longish sentence that crystallises 
the challenge to Callicles that Socrates is throwing down. Is the prospect of 
security through assimilation to the ruling power really what is consistent 
with his talk of the real “man”, and with a conception of the best way to live 
that measures up to that? It is the sort of question that might already have 
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been prompted by Callicles’ passionate opening speech (482c-486d), in 
which he advocates successively shattering and overriding law and conven-
tion, but then working within them, in each case as what someone who 
wants a realistic strategy for protecting himself against injustice will do.12
5. Assimilation with the demos
But Socrates has not yet dropped his bombshell. hat is delivered in the 
next sequence of remarks that he makes. Here Socrates points out that assi-
milation to the Athenian demos is what Callicles must embrace if, committed 
to the assimilation thesis as he has expressed himself, he is to cultivate the 
prevailing local power (513a):13
But in that case you should now be making yourself as much like the Athe-
nian demos as you can, if you are going to endear yourself to it and have great 
power in the city. See if that is in your best interests and mine. Heavens, we 
don’t want what they say happens to those who draw down the moon – the 
women of hessaly – to happen to us. We don’t want our choice of this de-
gree of power in the city to cost us the things that are dearest to us. 
his is a personal address to Callicles in which Socrates includes himself 
too, I suppose attempting a human gesture of friendship towards and 
solidarity with him. Presumably he does so as someone who himself sets 
great store by independence from the way the mass of people behave and 
think: an address quite diferent in style from the impersonal generalities 
about the real “man” in the immediately preceding passage. he unspoken 
thought behind it is an assumption on Socrates’ part, that when Callicles 
earlier subscribed to the assimilation thesis, it never occurred to him that the 
ruling power there discussed in general terms might in practice have to count 
as the demos, in the case relevant to his own situation. 
He now tries to preempt any attempt that Callicles might now make to 
argue that he could obtain the power he wants without assimilation to the 
demos as the city’s ruler (513a-c):
But if you think that anyone in the world is going to pass on to you some 
art or science of the kind which will make it so that you have great power in 
this city – whether for better or for worse – without assimilating yourself to 
its political system, then in my view, Callicles, you are making a big mistake. 
It’s not just a question of mimicking these people. You have to be like them 
in your very nature, if you are to make any real progress towards friendship 
12. See Woolf 2000.
13. I make a stronger break than do Dodds or the OCT between the clause beginning 
here (“But in that case”) and the question that closes the previous extract. Socrates now swit-
ches from considering an issue articulated in general terms, initially by use of impersonal 
verbs before introducing third person locutions, to addressing Callicles directly in the second 
person, and soon including himself in the considerations he puts to him. 
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with the Athenian demos14 – or in heaven’s name with the son of Pyrilampes, 
come to that. hat’s why it’s the person who will make you most like these 
people – that’s the person who will make you into a politician and rhetori-
cian in the way you want to be a politician. All groups of people take pleasure 
in speeches that conform to their own ethos, and are ofended by an ethos that 
isn’t theirs.
Why will only real assimilation to the demos, not the pretence or apeing 
of it, produce the political relationship with them that Callicles or any aspi-
ring Athenian politician desires?15 It is easy enough to conceive of a general 
argument which would deliver this conclusion: e.g. that those who pretend 
assimilation to a tyrant must already like him have an overpowering appetite 
for power, leading them to make the pretence, which shows that it is no mere 
pretence. 
Socrates ofers a general consideration of a diferent but similar kind, with 
its focus on rhetoric making it particularly relevant to politics in Athens. In 
efect he is suggesting that what counts there is the pleasure people take in the 
political oratory they hear (one of the dialogue’s major themes, of course), 
and that crucial to that is the ethos or – as Dodds explains it – the “spirit”16 
which informs the rhetoric. Ethos or spirit is evidently taken to be something 
that cannot easily be simulated and then sustained, whether in politics or 
indeed in love (as the emphatic reference to the son of Pyrilampes, recapitu-
lating Socrates’ initial salvo on the subject of Callicles’ afections (481d), is 
designed to remind us). he implication is that, given an Athenian political 
context, assimilation to the ruler or “the existing regime”(510a) must mean 
becoming like “the weak and the many” that Callicles despises (483b), the 
more convincingly and authentically so if one has accustomed oneself “from 
an early age to have the same likes and dislikes” (510d) – but at the cost of 
“the things that are dearest to us” (513a).17 
Socrates now seeks a response from Callicles (513c-d):
Socrates: Or do you disagree, dear friend? Do we have any answer to this, 
Callicles?
14. Kamtekar 2005 constitutes a sustained examination of what for a politician functio-
ning like Callicles in the Athenian democracy friendship with the demos should be taken to 
consist in. What should be noted, however, is that in the present context the idea of friendship 
with the demos is introduced without further elaboration simply as an instance of the general 
notion of friendship with a ruler or despot: where it is represented as involving accustoming 
oneself “from an early age, to have the same likes and dislikes as the despot, and take appro-
priate steps to resemble him as closely as possible”(510d).
15. Kamtekar 2005 p. 330-334 supplies an interesting discussion of this question.
16. Dodds 1959 p. 351.
17. As Irwin 1979 p. 232-233 points out, the interpretation of the dynamics of demo-
cratic politics that Socrates suggests here is further developed in the Republic, in which the 
demos, not the politician, is in the driving seat: see in particular R. 6, 493a-c.
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Callicles: In a way I can’t put my inger on, that is well said, I think, Socrates. 
But I still feel what most people feel: I’m not being entirely persuaded by 
you.18
Socrates: hat’s because you have the love of the demos in your soul, Callicles. 
hat’s what I’m up against. But if we examine these same questions oten 
enough, and in a better way, you will be persuaded.
Callicles is not made to say what in Socrates’ long speech he inds attractive, 
nor why he is not entirely persuaded. But it is probably safe to suppose that 
he is not impervious to the suggestion that a real ‘‘man’’ will have higher 
aspirations than simply staying alive. Ater all, the ideal he articulated in his 
advocacy of “natural” justice was of the right of those possessing superior 
intelligence and courage to exercise mastery over the weak (483a-485a). 
What is disconcerting him, and leaving him not yet convinced, must surely 
be meant to be Socrates’ “bombshell”: the concluding argument that for 
an Athenian politician the demos is the ruler to whom he has to assimilate 
himself. his is of course the irst time that the generalities of the assimilation 
thesis – where the ruler or the “existing regime”, when discussed in more 
speciic terms, has so far been imagined as a tyrant or despot – have been 
applied speciically to Athens and to the pursuit of power in the Athenian 
democracy. While it is one thing to uphold the assimilation thesis with 
enthusiasm, as specifying a key general condition for acquiring power and 
so security, it is quite another to think through and accept the implications 
of its application to politics in Athens. Socrates catches Callicles unawares, 
unprepared for the idea that the successful Athenian politician must have 
assimilated himself to the demos.
hat is certainly the interpretation that Plato has Socrates put on his 
response: “hat’s because you have the love of the demos in your soul, 
Callicles”.19 In other words, the diagnosis is not in the irst instance of any 
more purely intellectual slowness. Blindness to what is in front of his nose 
must be put down to something else. Eros has to be the explanation. Presu-
mably the suggestion is that Callicles is so infatuated that he cannot see 
that, for all his talk of the real “man”, he is already assimilated to the ethos 
18.  “I’m not being entirely persuaded by you”: so most translators. But Schoield and 
Gri th 2010 p. 97 have ‘‘I simply don’t believe you.’’ Either rendering of the Platonic Greek 
is possible, but the usual rendering might it better with Callicles’ irst statement. 
19. his eros for the demos has little ainity with the tyrannical eros driving every kind 
of lawless desire that governs the behaviour of the tyrannical kind of individual described in 
Book 9 of the Republic (9, 572d-575a). Of course, by the time Socrates has pressed Callicles 
on the psychology of the naturally superior man presented in his initial outburst at 482c-
486d, that turns out (491e-494c) to be not far removed from the Republic’s eros turannos. But 
what emerges in the later stretch of dialogue that concerns us is the gulf between Callicles’ 
professed ideals and ambitions and the reality of the eros for the demos that actually drives him.
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of the demos, to its likes and dislikes.20 And with it Plato connects with a 
theme in Athenian political discourse given most memorable articulation in 
surviving Greek literature in Aristophanes’ Knights. here, as Victoria Wohl 
explores in an exemplary study, Cleon (in the guise of a Paphlagonian slave) 
presents himself as lover (erastes) of the demos, personiied as his master 
Demos (Knights 732): “Pericles’ noble ‘love of the polis’ becomes, in Cleon’s 
debased enactment, political prostitution.”21 
We now start to appreciate Plato’s rationale in launching Socrates’ entire 
conversation with Callicles with a passage on their parallel twin love afairs. 
For himself, he said, it is with Alcibiades22 and philosophy,23 for Callicles the 
demos and the son of Pyrilampes. Here are the relevant comments he made 
on Callicles’ behaviour and mental state (481d-482a):
I notice that, clever as you are, it’s the same every time. Whatever your dar-
lings say, however they say things are, you have no power to oppose them, 
but keep changing your ground this way and that. In the assembly, if you say 
something and the Athenian demos disagrees, you change your ground and 
say what it wishes; and with the son of Pyrilampes, that beautiful young man, 
the same kind of thing happens to you. You are incapable of resisting the 
proposals and arguments of your darlings, with the result that, if anyone were 
ever to express surprise at the absurdity of what they are getting you to say on 
any particular occasion, you would probably say – if you wanted to tell the 
truth – that unless someone makes your darling give up this way of talking, 
then you won’t ever stop saying these things either.
6. Callicles’ choice
So, once again, there is argumentative success and failure: Socrates has 
retained Callicles’ participation in discussion. But Callicles has not been 
persuaded away from the stances he has adopted throughout. Socrates 
20. Ober 1998 p. 208 rightly says: “his is a pregnant moment, and perhaps the most 
optimistic in the dialogue.” Much more doubtful is his further comment: “Callicles has, at 
least momentarily, come to realize that he is infected with a certain ‘illness’ and the source of 
his illness is ‘the many’ – the very demos he has been taught to try to imitate, even to the point 
of losing his individual identity and voice.” As I read the exchange, and particularly Callicles’ 
confession that in a way he can’t quite put his inger on, he inds what Socrates has argued 
‘‘well said, I think”, he is represented as being very far from precise in any application he might 
make of it to self-understanding. 
21.  Wohl 2002 p.  75. Readers of her chapter “Pornos of the people” (Wohl 2002 
p. 73-123) will ind multiple anticipations of the Gorgias’s treatment of democratic rhetoric 
in the material on Cleon from Aristophanes and hucydides that she discusses.
22. Whom Socrates, in the irst of the Alcibiades dialogues attributed to Plato, fears will 
be corrupted by becoming an erastes of the demos: see Alc. 1 132a, with discussion in Wohl 
2002 p. 124-170.
23. For relections prompted by the Gorgias on what Plato might there (and subsequently 
in the Republic) take the role of eros in developing philosophical understanding to be, see 
Woolf 2000 p. 24-40.
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sees no way of moving him on except by “more and better arguments” 
about these same questions – which (he says) will persuade him (513c-d). 
he reader might ind such Socratic conidence in the power of reasoning 
over-optimistic. Logic does not oten cut much ice with the infatuated. 
However, as we shall be seeing shortly, in this instance it does obtain some 
degree of further success by the end of the long concluding stretch of the 
conversation now continued by Socrates and Callicles (513d-522d). To 
anticipate: the considerations Socrates will here put to Callicles do in the 
event succeed in getting him to see and understand his eros for the demos for 
the humiliating servility it really adds up to – but he will fail to talk him out 
of the commitments and behaviour that have been given momentum by that 
eros.24
Socrates’ talk of “more and better arguments” is the cue for a irst instal-
ment of further reasoning. In what follows Socrates approaches the same 
issues from a diferent angle, which is indicated in his opening sally (513d):
Anyway, remember how we said the activities that are directed to looking 
ater each of these things – body and soul – were two in number. We said 
that one of them approaches its object with a view to pleasure, the other with 
a view to what is best, not indulging it but battling with it. Weren’t those the 
deinitions we laid down earlier?
Callicles had agreed previously to this distinction, albeit only to “get your 
argument here completed, and do Gorgias here a favour” (501b-c); he now 
conirms that that was so. here follows an attempt to get him to relect upon 
what is his conception of political activity, and whether he is equipped to 
engage in it, initially by the usual Socratic method of analogy with other 
activities of public signiicance, such a public building project. Despite some 
reluctance to volunteer a view on Callicles’ part, he eventually reiterates his 
earlier opinion that there have been politicians in Athens who were good 
citizens and “made the citizens better rather than worse”: Pericles, Cimon, 
Miltiades, and hemistocles – for whom he shows sustained admiration 
(515c-d; cf. 503b-c, 517a-b).
his is the proposition Socrates now attacks, in an extraordinary passage 
mingling philosophical considerations put to Callicles with extended 
rhetorical denunciation (acknowledged as ‘‘real demagoguery’’ by Socrates 
himself: 519d) of the statesmen he has singled out for their achievement of 
good for the city. hey did not succeed in making the citizens better; and 
in the end the people turned upon each and every one of them. hose who 
say they made the city great do not realize that ‘‘the city is now a swollen, 
24.  I hope this distinction helps to meet a pertinent question put by the reviewer for 
Philosophie antique: whether that eros for the demos “rend vaine toute tentative de Socrate 
pour persuader Calliclès de l’incohérence de sa position”. See further p.  27 below, and my 
remarks in Section 7, “Conclusion”.
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festering sore because of those igures of the past’’ (518e-519a). In fact they 
were no better than sophists, who similarly claim to be teachers of human 
goodness, but then incongruously and illogically accuse their pupils of injus-
tice and ingratitude when they do not pay their fees or otherwise express 
their appreciation of their teachers. Callicles agrees that he has nothing but 
contempt for such illogicality on the part of such practitioners; and he agrees 
that the sign of a truly good practitioner is that the person who is well treated 
by him wants to do good in return (519e-521a). 
So Socrates is now ready to put the crucial question to him: what is the 
right way to care for the city? Is it “battling with the Athenians to make them 
as good as possible”? Or is it becoming their “servant” and trying to please 
them? He invites Callicles to speak “well and nobly”. What is the response?
Callicles: I say the one that involves becoming their servant.
Socrates: Nobly spoken! So you invite me to become a sycophant – a latterer!
And Callicles – through gritted teeth – agrees (521a-b).
Socrates has still not achieved the persuasion he hoped “more and better 
arguments” would have achieved. Nonetheless he has made progress. He has 
not attempted to orient the reasoning to get more decisive recognition from 
Callicles that the assimilation thesis applies to the situation of a power-hungry 
politician in Athens as much as it does under tyranny – although Callicles’ 
inal response suggests that he does now recognize just that. What the argu-
ment has instead taken as its basis is indeed something “better”: an articu-
lation of a more elevated conception of politics, contrasted with the politics 
of gratiication. Callicles is represented as exhibiting not a little attraction to 
this conception; and Socrates’ use of the vocabulary of nobility in that inal 
exchange is presumably an attempt to indicate that this notion of politics 
is the conception that marries more readily with the vision of a true man 
articulated in his original statement of his ideals. When in response Callicles 
explicitly couches his reply in terms of the thoroughly demeaning alternative: 
“becoming their servant”, this represents all but explicit acknowledgement 
that the demos, not the real “man”, will be master. He must now be aware 
that there is something incoherent and conlicted at the core of his whole 
outlook, as Socrates had predicted at the start of their encounter (482b).
he conversation continues (521b-d):
Callicles: Otherwise …
Socrates: Don’t tell me what you’ve told me over and over again – that any-
body who wants to will put me to death. I don’t want to have to say again 
that it will be a question of an evil man putting to death a good man. And 
don’t say he will coniscate whatever I possess. hat will save me saying: 
“Well, when he’s coniscated it he won’t have any good use for it. Just as he 
coniscated it from me unjustly, so, once he has taken it, he will use it unjust-
ly. And if unjustly, then disgracefully. And if disgracefully, then badly.”
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Callicles: You really do seem conident, Socrates, that none of these things 
will happen to you. As if living a quiet life means you couldn’t be dragged of 
to court, probably by someone utterly worthless and contemptible.
Socrates: hen I really am an idiot, Callicles, if I don’t realise that in this city 
anything can happen to anybody. One thing I do know, and that is that if I go 
to court, to face one of these dangers you are talking about, the one bringing 
me there will be an evil man – no decent person would take somebody who 
was not acting unjustly to court – and it would be no great surprise if I were 
put to death. Do you want me to tell you why that is what I expect?
And with that Socrates introduces his famous comparison with what 
would happen to a doctor prosecuted by a chef before a jury of children. 
For his part Callicles wavers not a moment from his conviction that 
having no power to protect oneself from injustice is the worst thing that 
could happen to someone (522d). And when Socrates indicates that he will 
tell a myth to spell out the consequences of acting unjustly that will be visited 
upon perpetrators ater death, he makes it clear that as far as he is concerned 
the conversation, one-sided as he now represents it, is – inally – over (522e):
Callicles: Well, you’ve worked your way through the rest of the discussion, so 
you’d better work your way through this too.
7. Conclusion
“Socrates and Callicles cannot in the end make dialectical contact”, says 
James Doyle, articulating a not uncommon assessment.25 I hope this article 
will have done something to show that the situation is not in fact what that 
verdict might suggest. On the reading of the last section of conversation 
between the two protagonists ofered here, these pages of the Gorgias emerge 
as something else. hey are an attempt by Plato to show just why and how 
Socrates might successfully engage intellectually with an intelligent young 
politician hoping to rise within the Athenian democracy, such as Callicles 
is portrayed as being. All communication between them had broken down 
at 506c (efectively a page earlier, at 505c). But at 509c Callicles reenters 
the conversation when Socrates returns to the question of how we best 
protect ourselves against the greatest evils. hat is territory he is willing to 
explore jointly with Socrates – or in other words, to allow Socrates to ques-
tion him about. On some things they ind a measure of agreement, on others 
not. At more than one point Socrates abandons dialectic for rhetoric, in his 
eforts to persuade Callicles to look at things diferently from the way he is 
predisposed to do. In general, however, there is no radical failure of mutual 
comprehension. 
25. Doyle 2006, p. 96-97.
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At one juncture, it is true, where Socrates spells out what he takes to be 
the implications of the assimilation thesis in the context of the Athenian 
democracy for a politician wanting to cultivate the friendship of the ruling 
power, Callicles is in efect made to confess that he neither fully unders-
tands nor is altogether persuaded by Socrates’ line of thought (513c). Eros 
for the demos, is Socrates’ immediate diagnosis: Callicles is blinded by the 
way the likes and dislikes of the demos, reinforced by his rhetorical training, 
have already shaped his soul. His afections have clouded his ability to grasp 
reality. Yet ater several more pages of Socratic talk in more than one mode, 
he does take the point he could not quite grasp there: he bites the bullet, and 
gives it as his view that good politics and good citizenship have to be a matter 
of lattering and gratifying the city’s ruling power (521a-b). 
So there is no ultimate failure of intellectual communication between 
them, at least in any basic sense. Plato does not represent the intelligent 
Athenian democratic politician as “unable to take part in the same discus-
sion”26 with Socrates. What prompts Callicles to tell Socrates to inish things 
of himself, when ater all Socrates is not actually inviting him to engage in 
further conversation, is something else. Callicles is now absolutely clear that, 
despite their best eforts, he and Socrates will never ind enough agreement 
on what they value most to make further conversation worthwhile. hat 
is a matter of what Plato wants us to understand as diferent fundamental 
commitments, not of mutual incomprehension, nor even of incompatible 
intellectual styles.27
26. Doyle 2006 p. 97.
27. Translations used are those of Schoield and Gri th 2010 (with occasional minor 
variations). I am grateful for comments from audiences in Athens (BSA), Princeton, Yale, 
Prague, Oxford, Stanford, UCLA, and Berlin (Humboldt University) who heard a talk from 
which this version has been developed, and to the reviewer for Philosophie antique for further 
comments and corrections.
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